The present article examines the two-sided concept of dignitas and analyses its ethical and legal components -worthiness and aptitude. The contribution focuses on a particularly serious case of indignitas, heresy, to highlight the tension between formal dignitas and substantial indignitas of the heretical bishop not yet condemned. Then, it explores the solution envisaged by Canon lawyers to solve such tension in the gravest case of heresy, that of the pope. Finally, it seeks to explain why such a solution was not viable as such, but it had to be mediated through a figure contiguous yet different from heresy -schism.
the first and truest judge was God Himself, judging was somehow divine. The wider the powers of the judge, the closer the resemblance to the divine Judge: 'homo iudex gerii vicem iudicis Dei in indicando'' 1 '). Iurisdictio not only expressed authority but also measured it, thus defining one's own personal status. In a relational context, iurisdictio was expressed in terms of maiestas (i.e., maioritasy). 'Maiestas -says Jacobus de Ravanis -dicitur quasi maior status' 4 ). Maiestas marked an 'unequal relationship' 5 ). Iurisdictio presupposed hierarchy, as it was exercised by the maior on the minor. The Canon law principle that an inferior could not judge a superior 6 ) was a corollary of the jurisdictional nature of the relation maioritas/minoritas. When, on the contrary, iurisdictio was used in absolute terms and not in relation to someone else, it was usually expressed in terms of dignitas 1 ). Dignitas represented the personal status of the iudex and determined the degree of iurisdictio he enjoyed. The higher the dignitas of a judge, the greater was his iurisdictio.
Dignitas is at the same time an ethical and a legal concept, for it expresses both worthiness and aptitude. It measures reputation and good fame 8 ) as much as iurisdictio and auctoritas. In medieval jurisprudence such ambiguity in the language is not accidental. Dignitas is a two-faced notion, whose different employment in the legal and the moral domains is the adaptation of a unitary concept to different purposes. The ambiguity (or, rather, complexity) of dignitas becomes all the more apparent in its opposite -indignitas. Indignitas has two meanings as well. One is ethical, marking the person so qualified as blameworthy. The other is 'functional', and signifies the incapacity of doing, having or enjoying something. Commenting on the maiores heretici, Azo does not say that they deserved a more severe punishment, but that they 'maiori et special-iori sunt poena digni''). Similarly, when reporting the struggle for the imperial throne between Philip of Swabia and Otto, the second son of Henry of Saxony, Bernardus Parmensis notes that the papal legate 'personam philippi reputauit indignam: personam vero ottonis denunciami idoneam ad imperium obtinendum ,ie ). Just like indignitas, inidoneitas (a medieval neologism to express the lack of idoneitas)"), describes the (functional) incapacity to achieve something or to retain it. When commenting on the deposition of the Patriarch of Aquileia Gothofredus, in 1186, for having crowned Henry VI as Rex Longobardorum in spite of the papal veto, Alvarus Pelagius observes that, casted outside the Church, the Patriarch became 'inidoneus" to the episcopate 12 ). In these cases the concept of 'dignitas' is not ethical, but functional and 'technical'.
The two meanings of indignitas find a synthesis in the concept of infamia. Infamia is the nemesis of dignitas. Infamia, it is known, could be either facti or iuris. The Decretum does not provide a precise definition of either, but describes their main features 13 ). When facti, infamia conveys a social mark of disesteem 14 ); when iuris, it entails a deminutio in one's own legal status' 5 )·
The two kinds of infamia, however, are not extraneous to each other. For that who enjoys a maior status (and so a vaster iurisdictio) has to be dignus of it. Such dignitas is at the same time ethical and legal, moral and 'functional', facti and iuris. The conceptual indivisibility of the notion of dignitas postulates a similar unitarity in its practical declination. If good fame entails illesa dignitas, ill fame erodes it.
Legal status has to mirror moral values since he who is less worthy cannot enjoy a higher status. Accordingly, disesteem in the ethical and social sphere ought to entail some consequences in the legal domain. Our problem is the legal consequences of the fracture between the two faces of dignitas. Such a fracture may occur within the Civil law, when the ruler behaves as a tyrant, or within the Canon law, when the bonus sacerdos becomes malus pastor. The purpose of this study is to see whether and to what extent an (ethically) indignus could retain his (legal) dignitas in the medieval legal discourse. The study will focus on a particularly serious case of indignitas, heresy, to highlight the tension between formal dignitas and substantial indignitas of the heretic not yet condemned. Then, it will explore the solution envisaged by Canon lawyers to solve such tension in the gravest case of heresy -that of the pope. Finally, it will explain why such a solution was not viable as such, but it had to be mediated through a figure contiguous yet different from heresy -schism.
II. Heresy and indignitas in Canon law
The tension between ethical unworthiness and legal status occurs when one enjoys a position he is unworthy of, like the case of the unworthy judge, the iudex indignus (or minus idoneus). Even in a secular tribunal it would be difficult to accept an immoral judge. But in a religious tribunal, immorality in the judge becomes structurally intolerable because the maioritas from which his iurisdictio stems is ethical as much as legal. Not being iustus (and so lying outside the ius) one may not render a judgment (ius-dicere) 16 ). As Guido de Baysio puts it 17 ):
per multa exempta ostendit quod mali non possunt iudicare, quia Deus non audit eorum orationes, ergo nec eorum iudicia
There is hardly anything more reproachable -both ethically and legally -for the Church than refusing its own teachings. Hence, the Church saw in heresy the highest and foremost case of indignitas. The heretic's indignitas is at the same time moral and legal -unworthiness and unfitness. The heretic is not dignus of ius dicere. On a legal ground, he ought not to enjoy any iurisdictio, for he cannot be maior than any faithful Christian. On a moral ground, he ought not to judge, for he is not iustus n ).
The moral reprobation of the Church against heresy is such that it has to entail the legal condemnation of the heretic. There is no apparent fracture between ethics and law in heresy, as they both chastise it with equal vigour. Being unworthy of it, no heretic may be called to any dignitas. between the two spheres, however, resurfaces if the moral reprobation creeps in at a later stage, when one becomes heretic while he is already enjoying a dignitas. This case goes straight to the core of our problem -the (legal) enjoyment of a dignitas by a (morally) indignus. There, Canon law's 'reaction' becomes tantalising: the heretic's indignitas renders him unworthy of his status, but it does not necessarily deprive him of it. Hence, the indignus may remain formally vested in a dignitas he ought not to enjoy any longer.
Usually judgments ascribe legal consequences to natural facts. But heresy is a sin, not the status ascribed to the sinner by the ecclesiastical tribunal that condemns him. The effects of a sin manifest themselves immediately into the sinner. The first and foremost consequence of heresy is the separation of the sinner from both the true faith and the unity of the Church, based as it is on the unitas fidei' 9 ). One does not deviate from the true faith because a judgment says so. The judgment merely acknowledges a deviation that has already taken place. The consequences of the sin of heresy are already present and effective at the very moment the sin is committed 20 ). Because of its gravity, heresy has to be formally acknowledged, and so its legal effects must but follow the formal condemnation of the heretic. The heretic, however, is not such because of his condemnation. Far from altering one's own status, the condemnation for heresy merely acknowledges the change in it. The purpose of the sentence of excommunication of the heretic, indeed, is to formally ascertain (to 'ratify') a deviation from the faith of the Church that has already taken place 21 )· Its function is to acknowledge a fact already in existence and, since that fact is a sin, already producing its effects. In other words, the nature of the judgment of the heretic is declaratory, not constitutive. The heretic deviates from the faith and so from the communion of the Church because of his sin and not because a judicial pronouncement so states Yet the legal effects of heresy, immediate as they may be, are far from being exhaustive. Until deprived of his iurisdictio, the heretical bishop ought not to exercise it, but he cannot be prevented from so doing. If he uses of his powers he commits an abuse, but his acts will be valid the same 36 ):
tenet eorum sententia: ipsi tamen peccant iudicando
The case of the bishop already fallen into heresy but not yet condemned for it produces a tension that Canon law may neither structurally accept nor immediately expunge. This tension ultimately derives from the complexity of the concept of dignitas. The moral unworthiness of the heretical bishop is already proof enough of his legal unfitness. Unfit as he may be, however, the heretical bishop has to be formally condemned before he can be removed. Until his condemnation, therefore, he will retain a status of which he is both unworthy and substantially unfit. But the legal system requires a formal condemnation before depriving him of a status he does not deserve anymore. The ensuing tension is a conflict between form and substance. As for the substance, heresy has already severed the bishop from the Church. As for the form, however, the bishop has not suffered a sentence of excommunication, nor has his doctrine been condemned as heretical yet. It is not possible, therefore, to prevent him from exercising his powers. As long as the heretical bishop does not exercise his powers, the conflict between form and substance remains latent. The moment he makes use of them, however, the conflict breaks down and the bishop commits a sin -peccai. When exercising jurisdictional prerogatives of which he is indignus (in both the meanings of unworthiness and unfitness), the iudex condemns himself 37 ): 
criminosus alterius criminis iudex esse non potest, et se ipsum condempnat, dum in alterius crimen sententiam proferí
The (moral) condemnation of the criminosus iudex betrays the unlawfulness of his conduct, but does not prevent his decision from standing. Until the formal (that is, judicial) deprivation of his status, the conflict between form and substance will be tangible each time the heretic bishop will exercise those powers he ought not to possess any longer. The sin he commits in exercising them betrays the substantial unlawfulness of his iurisdictio. The wound between form and substance is inflicted in the moment the bishop becomes heretical and, so to speak, keeps on bleeding until he is formally condemned and divested of his powers. Ultimately, therefore, the purpose of his condemnation is to mend such a wound, to restore coherence and unity in a legal system as ethically oriented as Canon law.
III. The nisi a fide devius clause
The deeper a wound, the more urgent the care it requires. It is not surprising that the first answer to this tension between form and substance was provided right where the tension reached its apex -in the case of the heretical pope. In granting complete judicial immunity to the pope, the Decretum provided a single exception 38 ):
[Papa] a nemine est iudicandus, nisi deprehendatur a fide devius
Just like the heretical bishop (in fact, like any Christian whosoever), the communion with the universal church is severed in the moment the pope places himself outside of it 39 ). Deviare a fide deprives him of his iurisdictio so that, becoming minor than any Christian, he may be judged by any Christian 40 ). The problem lies in the fact that, as long as the pope is not found heretic, he remains maior and, as such, he cannot be judged by anyone (for, as we have seen before, iurisdictio is exercised by the maior on the minor). To get around this logical impasse, Canon lawyers followed two different routes. Some held that the universalis ecclesia -represented by the ecumenical council or by the collegium of the cardinals -is above the pope, and so it is able to judge him. Others argued that the moment the pope separates himself from the Church he ceases ipso facto to be the Vicar of Christ. We are particularly interested in this second route. In order to examine it, two summae shall be briefly mentioned: the first because of its special attention to the effects of heresy to the belonging to the Church, the second for its crucial importance 41 ).
In the Summa Et est sciendum, the author wonders why heresy is so different from any other sin 42 ):
set quare est in heresi speciale? Quia cetera peccata unitatem ecclesie non rumpunt. Cum ceteris enim uiciis potest esse homo membrum ecclesie licet putridum. Heresis uero uel scisma ipsam uiolant unitatem etfundamentum fidei maculant et corrumpunt, unde cum sit hereticus est quolibet catholico minor Heresy separates the heretical pope from the unitas ecclesiae. In the moment the pope is no longer in communion with the Church, he places himself outside of it. Hence the juxtaposition between heresy and schism ('heresis uero uel scisma'), for they produce the same effect. They tarnish and corrupt the unity and the very ground of the faith (' unitatem et fundamentum fidei maculant et corrumpunt'). What is particularly interesting is the author's use of the verb 'corrumpunf instead of'rumpunt'. The reason is not only stylistic (since 'rumpunt' had just been used a variatio was appropriate). 'Corrumpunt' describes the very process leading from heresy to schism. ' Corrumpere' is the development of 'maculare'. Unlike other vitia ('ceteris enim uiciis') tainting the man's soul but leaving him in communion with the Church ('membrum ecclesie licet putridum'), heresy and schism tarnish the sinner but also 'violant' the unity of the Church. The sin of heresy 'maculai' the sinner, 'corrumpet' his communion with the Church, and ultimately 'violât' the very unity of the Church itself. The moment the pope places himself outside its unity and communion because of heresy or schism, he deprives himself of his maiestas/ dignitas and, consequently, of his iurisdictio. He is quolibet catholico minor and, as such, he can be judged by any Christian 43 ). The nisi a fide devins clause resolves the tension between form and substance right where it becomes unbearable. Heresy operates ipso facto but must be ascertained ope sententiae. In the case of the pope, the tension is insoluble: who can judge the supreme judge? It is the uniqueness of the 'crisis' that compels its interpreters to resort, so to speak, to the last weapon at their disposal: the legal death of the heretical pope. Before the advent of conciliarist doctrines, Canon lawyers had to argue that the heretical pope does not exist: 'sive hereticus sive papa\ Unlike the case of the heretical bishop, the 'legal aberration' of the vicar of God that denies God, the head of the Church who is not in communion with the Church itself, could not be tolerated even temporarily. In the moment he becomes devius ('ι/ι eo quod hereticus esf) the pope severs his belonging to the Church so that, for the law ofthat same Church, he does not exist anymore.
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IV. The schism in Canon law
The solution envisaged to solve the problem of the heretical pope was based on the ipso facto applicability of legal death: the very fact of his heresy was sufficient to 'delete' him from the legal framework of the Church, to render him non-existing for it -sive papa sive hereticus. Ingenious as it was in its abstractness, such a solution was hardly applicable in practice. To render legal death a viable route, the fracture between the indignus and the values embodied in the legal system, between form and substance, had to be complete. As long as form remained divorced from substance it conferred a show of legality sufficient to preserve -albeit precariously -the iurisdictio of the indignus. This is why Canon lawyers progressively opted for schism as a concept contiguous but not identical to heresy.
The continuity between heresy and schism lies in the meaning of heresy. In the Canon law discourse, heresy is not only a mistake in an article of faith. Obviously, heretic is first of all that who 'erravit in expositione sacrae scriptural 48 ). The heresy of the two bishops lies in their 'perturbing' the unitas ecclesiae. It is interesting to note that the object of the verb 'conturbantes' is not the purity of the faith, but the unity of the Church. The subtle ambiguity of this excerpt is that a physical entity like the unity of the Church is not the obvious object of the state verb 'conturbare'. It is the same ambiguity of the phrase 'recedere ab integritate catholicae fideV, where an action verb was used in lieu of a state verb. As Johannes Teutonicus explains 54 ): The deviatio a ventate is already divisio ab ecclesia. As such, only a short distance separates heresy from schism, for any heresy ultimately leads to the divorce from the Church 56 ):
stricte sumitur hereticus omnis qui remotus est ab ecclesia
The distinction between heresy and schism is laid out in Teutonicus' Gloss 57 ):
potest dici quod hec sit differentia inter heresim et schisma que est inter dispositionem et habitum. primo enim dicitur schisma sed cum post tempus pertinaciter adheseritsue secte dicitur heresis. Vel aliter dicas quod omnis hereticus sit schismaticus: sed non convertitur. et sic est illa differentia que inter speciem et genus
While heresy requires dispositio, a mental element, schism is just habitus, a form of observed conduct. Hereticus is that who errs, who deviates from the faith of the Church. Such a deviation may occur directly from the Church (in which case the devians is scismaticus), or it may originate in a diversion from its faith (and so the errans is hereticus). Heresy and schism, says Teutonicus, are 'gradus': different intensities, different degrees of a same thing -the separation from the Church 58 ). In the case of heresy, this deviation occurs in the private of one's own conscience. In the case of schism, on the contrary, the deviation takes place outside of the sinner's soul, and therefore it is immediately visible. When heresy is still just within one's own soul it lacks of habitus, it is occulta, it 'lurks in the shadows in the vineyard of the Lord' 59 )· It is not the Church, therefore, that has to (re)act against such a manifest deviatio and condemn the devians. It is the devius that renders himself extraneus to it. Schismatics, indeed, 'hi sunt qui segregarti seipsos'"). While the burden to identify and expel the heretic lies on the Church, in the case of schism such a task is, so to speak, performed by the schismatic himself. His deviation from the Church is external (and so tangible), and does not need any further distinction. It is immaterial whether the schismatic has the intention to withdraw from the Church: as long as the habitus attests a deviatio ab ecclesia, his dispositio is irrelevant. Schismatics, in fact, 'segregarti seipsos, animant vel seipsam non habentes' 6i ). It is interesting to note that nearly any time Canon lawyers refer to schism, the verb they employ to describe the departing from the Church of the schismatic is in the active form. The schismatic segregai / separat / dividit himself from the Church, he is not segregatur / separatur / dividitur from it. His visible dissociation from the Church betrays a condition of complete extraneousness from it that does not require any further action by the Church 69 ).
Whereas in heresy it is the Church that casts the devians out of itself, in the case of schism the separatio occurs immediately because of the deeds of the devians, of his habitus. While it is possible to envisage a moment in which the heretic is still formally (in habitu) within the Church but substantially (in dispositione) outside of it, the same is not possible for schism. Schism, in other words, operates ipso iure from the very moment of its inception 70 ). In the moment one becomes schismatic, he is already outside the communio ecclesiae and separated from the Church, so that he cannot enjoy any potestas in the Church 71 ). In the words of Innocentius IV The importance of the distinction between dispositio and habitus is well attested. Seeking to put an end to the dispute with the Franciscans on the right of the Church to own substances, Pope John XXII issued the Constitutions Ad conditorem and Cum inter nonnullos (1322 and 1323 respectively) . The Emperor Ludwig of Bavary seized the opportunity to accuse him of notorious heresy as a fide devius deprehensus, so to proclaim his deposition at Pisa on the 13 th December 1328 73 ). It was right at the moment of the publication of the two Constitutions, held the Emperor, that the 'nisi a fide devius' clause was ipso facto triggered. Ludwig agreed that no Christian could judge the pope's dispositio, but insisted that any faithful could (and ought to) notice his heretical habitus. In other words, according to Ludwig of Bavary, John XXII's fallacious belief became justiciable heresy in the very moment he rendered it manifest, because in that moment the (internal) dispositio became (external) habitus 1 ").
Just a couple of decades earlier, another pope had to face a similar but thornier issue. At the eve of the fourteenth century, the detractors of one of the most controversial popes of the late Middle Ages, Boniface VIII, found an excellent ground for contesting the validity of his election in the unprecedented abdication of his predecessor, Celestine V. Of the two most famous pamphlets against Boniface, one was the accusation of heresy by the French King Philip the Fair in 1303, the other was the accusation of schism by the Colonna cardinals, Jacopus and his nephew Petrus, six years earlier, in 1297. In that year, the Colonnas issued three manifestos against Boniface. The third was the harshest and, at the same time, the most legally-minded one. As much as their opponent, the Colonnas were consummate Canon lawyers and instead of attacking the Pope as heretic, they opted for schism. Boniface, held the Colonna cardinals, was schismatic because he had separated himself from the true Pope, and so from the true Church. At the same time they masterfully sug- gested that his schismatic conduct verged on heresy -another topos amongst Canon lawyers 75 )· This way, the Colonnas were entrenching their arguments on sound ground. The very fact that the previous Pope was still alive while the new one was elected proved the invalidity of Boniface's election. The very presence of a second and false pope necessarily led to a bicephalous church, and so to schism. Being schismatic, the Colonna held, the pope was ipso iure divested of any dignitas and expelled from the Church.
V. Legal death and vacatio sedis
The solution to the problem of the heretical pope was an applicationalthough one of the first in time and surely the foremost in importanceof the concept of legal death in Canon law. During the thirteenth century Canon lawyers progressively shifted their attention from the heretical pope to the bishop in haeresi deprehensus. Because of the contiguity of the two crimina it was not difficult, as we have just seen, to move from heresy to schism. And yet the advantages of schism were evident. Albeit heretical, and so substantially outside of the Church, the bishop would formally retain his status (and so his maiestas/maioritas) until formally condemned. Schism, on the contrary, operated ipso iure. Applying to the devius bishop the same rational as the devius pope, Canon lawyers ultimately achieved the same result: the ipso iure deposition through legal death. With the fictio iuris of the bishop's legal death, Canon lawyers were able to consider the episcopal chair to be vacant.
The bishop was the head of the capitulum. As such, Canon lawyers could not accept a prolonged situation in which he was unable to preside over and legally represent it. Probably one of the first instances in which measures were taken for such a problem was the case of insanity. By the mid-1170s it was already a well-established principle that an insane bishop -though not merely an old one -should be replaced as soon as possible 76 ).
In Teutonicus' Gloss there may be found the seeds of the future developments of the concept of legal death. Just as the Civilians were doing on their part 77 ), he worked out the analogy between legal and physical death moving from the admission into a monastic order. The monk, in fact, is 'dead to the world' ('monachus mortus reputatur mundo') 1 *). As the figure of the hermit, 'quasi divisus ab aliis\ was used to explain the separation of the heretic from the Church 79 ), so the figure of the monk was the perfect gateway for applying the legal consequences of death to cases not involving physical demise ('mors civilis') 80 ). The first extension was the case of the deposition of the bishop, to which Teutonicus applied the same effects as physical death 81 ). Teutonicus did not go as far as considering the bishop dead when fallen into a schism, yet in his Gloss there are two passages suggesting that the loss of the bishop's dignitas may occur without a legal pronouncement. The first passage is a comment on the expulsion of a bishop from his bishopric occurred without a legal decision. Interestingly enough, the question was not whether it was possible to expel a bishop without a legal pronouncement, but whether the crimes of the bishop were serious enough to justify such an expulsion ('deiectionem dignum') 82 ). The second passage hinted at some crimina that might justify the loss of a bishopric ipso iure and not ope sententiae. The casus belli was the dissipation of the ecclesiastical goods by a bishop who did not want to appoint an oeconomus -who would have checked his conduct -so contravening a compulsory Canon law rule. With his conduct, the bishop 'sacerdotali dignitati obtrectatio generavit', so that ''episcopo infamia genere tur': the obtrectatio of his dignitas entails infamia"). The most important developments, however, took place with the Compilationes Antiquae and the Liber Sextus, through an increasingly wider reasoning per analogiam. Until the Decretum, as we have just seen, the only case of vacatio sedis contiguous to the death of the bishop was his deposition. The deposition of a bishop, it should be noted, connects an ethical cause with a legal consequence. The bishop should be deposed if notoriously criminosus and, once deposed, he would lose any iurisdictio over the bishopric. It may not appear irrational to imagine that initially the analogical reasoning of Canon lawyers focused on the 'external' side of the deposition -its legal consequences. So, they held that the sedis would be vacans in situations akin to depositio: the spontaneous renunciatio of the bishop and his translatio onto a different bishopric 84 ). At the same time, however, deposition was the legal consequence of an ethical cause. As such, the reason for being deposed was the criminen the bishop had committed. The 'inner' side of the deposition lay in the criminosus status of the bishop, a status calling for the deprivation of his dignitas. Hence, as observed Johannes Andreae when recalling the Gloss of Teutonicus on the dissipatio of the ecclesiastical goods, the legal death of the bishop occurs not only in cases formally akin (that is, 'externally' similar) to the depositio, but also when the ethical reason leading to the deposition is substantially ('internally') the same: 'pone, quodpeccavit' 85 ). Obviously, the peccatum calling for the deposition of the sinner has to be an extremely serious one. Johannes Andreae was in fact referring to those crimina leading to the excommunication of a prelate. Yet, as we have seen, any crimen requiring the expulsion of the reus from the Church -and so, if the case be, the loss of any dignitas he enjoyed therein -needed a formal pronouncement. the inability of the elected to retain that dignitas. So the abbey remains vacans even after the election 86 ), because the election of an indignus is void 87 )· In its 'functional' meaning of unfitness, indignitas is at the same time the incapacity to acquire a dignitas and the inability to retain it. It follows that, for the same reason for which the monk was not able to acquire the dignitas of abbot, he would not have been able to retain it, had he become indignus after the election. In other words, the same legal reason requiring the sedis to remain vacans despite the election of an indignus militates in favour of its vacancy when its legitimate holder becomes indignus.
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For the law of the Church, the foremost cases of indignitas were, quite obviously, those in which one abjured the Church itself: heresy and schism. It was not doubted that those bishops 'in haeresim iam damnatam et indubitatam incidentes'' were legally dead 88 ), so that anyone 'a tali obedientia propria auctoritate recedi potest'™). This, however, was not an exception but a confirmation of the need of a judicial decision to condemn the heretic, for the heresy in which those bishops fell had already been condemned. In legal terms, the mors of the excommunication lies in that it alters the legal status of the excommunicated. It is right in the case of the vacatio sedis due to the bishop's indignitas that we can fully appreciate the difference between heresy and schism. Despite heresy should operate ipso facto, for the reasons before discussed the heretical bishop retained his iurisdictio until formally excommunicated. Until then, the capitulum had to obey to the bishop, although heretic. On the point, the Decretum was remarkably straightforward and did not leave much room to subtle distinctions 94 ):
ante tempus sententiae non licet clericis ab episcopo suo discedere
Criminosus and hereticus a bishop may be, echoes Teutonicus, 'tamen non liceret archidiácono vel alicui subiectorum ab eo discedere ante diffinitivam sententiam ,9S ). In the case of schism, on the contrary, there is no such tension within the legal system between 'being' and 'should be'. Schism operates ipso iure. In the very moment of his schism, the schismatic places himself outside the Church and it is no longer recognised by its law. Legally speaking, he has nothing to do with the rules governing the Body of Christ, because he does not belong to it any longer. A schismatic is dead. In order to consider the bishopric as vacans when occupied by a schismatic bishop, a straightforward route was found in the capitis deminutio maxima. Any civis held prisoner by hostes imperii was held legally dead until liberated and restored into his previous position according to the iuspostliminium. Just as he who embraced the religious life was to be considered mortus mundo, so the prelate kept apud hostes was legally dead. Initially, Canon lawyers dealt with the rather scholastic case of a bishop held captivus by the enemies of the Roman Empire. Yet the boundaries of the Empire were not merely geographi- cal. As for the Civil lawyers the Empire extended over any populus abiding by the ius civile, so for the Canon lawyers the boundaries of the Respublica christianorum lay where the communion with the Church ended or was severed. Hence, in the Liber Sextus the bishop was subjected to capitis deminutio maxima, and so to legal death, not only when kept prisoner by hostes imperii, but also by pagans or -crucially -schismatics 96 Schismatics, being ipso iure indigni, could neither acquire nor retain any dignitas. Severing the communion with the Church, they placed themselves beyond its boundaries, becoming extranei to the very locus of validation of their dignitas. Not recognised anymore by the law of the Church, they became structurally unable to exercise any iurisdictio over their bishopric. For a new heresy, moral indignitas would result in legal indignitas only with its condemnation ope sententiae. The same was not true for schism, where no legal barrier stood between unworthiness and unfitness. Hence, in the very moment the bishop became schismatic, he would lose ipso iure his dignitas. A schismatic is dead to the Church, and a bishop is no exception to that principle. The moment the schismatic bishop is legally dead, his sedis becomes ipso iure vacans 9S ). 
VI. Conclusion
While in Civil law it is possible to separate -at least conceptually -positive law from legal theory, the same is not true for Canon law. In the law of the Church the ius positum has to be the logical prosecution of a theological and ecclesiological unitary discourse. The separation from the unity of the Church is at the same time theological (deviatio a fide), ecclesiological (.separatio ab ecclesia) and legal (destitutio a dignitate). Severing the link with the Church in all these three levels, schism represents the fullest case of divisio").
We have seen the tension existing within the legal system in the case of heresy. Applied in particularly serious contexts, such a tension could not be left unsolved: an immediate answer was called for by the very system. Such was the case of the heretical pope, where that tension was magnified up to the breaking point of the legal system itself. There cannot be a heretical pope yet to be judged. In the language of validity, such a pope does not exist anymore -he is dead ('pro mortuo habetur') 100 ). His 'legal death', moreover, is coherent with the concept of dignitas in its 'functionalist' meaning. The pope is 'dead' because, being devius a fide, 'non potest esse caput Christianorum'' 01 ).
It is impossible (or rather unacceptable) that the highest dignitas be vested in the most indignus -the devius a fide. Such an unacceptable conflict between form and substance was the same in the heretical bishop, so the same solution was applied thereto. Legal death was well suited to translate such a non posse from the ethical dimension to the legal realm, and schism was the only viable option to trigger legal death ipso iure.
The 'mystical marriage' between bishop and Church lies on two levels because the Church is at the same time both the local and the universal one. In Canon law (particularly in times of growing claims of Rome's authority over the local churches) the bishop retained his jurisdiction over his bishopric as long as he remained in communion with the universal Church 'higher' communion was broken, the bishop would become ipso iure extraneous to his own church as well. Schism, as we have seen, is the separation from the Church, the 'one and indivisible' Body of Christ. The ipso iure loss of jurisdiction of the schismatic bishop was ultimately a product of the indivisibility of the Church. Just as heresy, schism was considered qualitatively different from the other sins because of its gravity. But, unlike heresy, schism was visible and tangible, and because of its 'tangibility', being habitus and not dispositio, it ought to produce tangible effects. The mere possibility of 'modulating' the legal consequences of schism on the bishop's authority (that is, considering his iurisdictio illegitimate but still valid) would have tangibly disproved the indivisibility of the 'mystical body' of the Church itself. From this perspective, the ipso iure anathema against the bishop-schismatic amounted but to a natural and necessary consequence of the very structure of the Church. The case of the heretical pope paved the way to the ipso iure legal death on a theoretical and conceptual level; that of the schismatic bishop made it viable on a more practical basis. 
